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INTERTIDAL ZONE AQUACULTURE AND
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
JuliaM. Underwood"
I. INTRODUCTION

As interest in the potential of shellfish aquaculture increases nationwide in the next several years, conflicts over access to and use of the
intertidal zone undoubtedly will increase as well. In Massachusetts and
Maine these conflicts are likely to be more pronounced because of an
atypical division of public and private rights and responsibilities in that
zone. In contrast to most other areas of the country, where the state owns
title to land between the high and low water marks, Massachusetts and
Maine riparian property owners hold title in fee down to the low water
mark. That grant of title, however, originally conveyed under the
Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47,1 is subject to public rights of fishing,
*
University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1996. The University of Maine
School of Law Environmental Law Society supported the research for this Comment with
a grant in the Summer of 1995. This Comment was originally written to fulfill the
requirements of the Coastal Zone Law course at the University of Maine School of Law
in the Fall of 1995.
1. THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAUUES AND LIBERTYEs CONCERNING THE
INHABITANTS OF THE MASSACHUSETS, Liberties Common, 35 (1648), reprintedin THE

BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAwES AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF THE

OF THE MASSACHUSETS 51 (intro. by Thomas G. Barnes, 1975) [hereinafter BOOK OF THE
GENERAL LAUUES]. The ordinance read in pertinent part:
Everie Inhabitant who is an hous-holder shall have free fishing and
fowling, in any great Ponds, Bayes, Coves and Rivers so far as the Sea ebs and
flows, within the precincts of the town where they dwell, unles the Free-men
of the same town, or the General Court have otherwise appropriated them
....
[I]t is declared that in all creeks, coves and other places, about and upon
salt water where the Sea ebs and flows, the Proprietor of the land adjoyning
shall have proprietie to the low water mark where the Sea doth no ebb above
a hundred rods, and not more wheresoever it ebs farther. Provided that such
Proprietor shall not by this libertie have power to stop or hinder the passage of
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fowling, and navigation. As a result, clam aquaculture, which must be
conducted within the intertidal zone, will test the boundaries of public
rights as they are currently understood in those states.

In two recent cases, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
addressed the issue of private and public rights in the intertidal zone as
related to clam aquaculture. In Town of Wellfleet v. Glaze,2 the court held

that the superior court lacked the authority to enjoin a defendant littoral
property owner from mooring his boats on an aquaculture site. Although
the majority did not address the issue of whether aquaculture should be
construed as within the public right of fishing, a concurring justice wrote:
"[The right to fish cannot reasonably be construed to include the right to
plant, cultivate, and propagate fish on the defendant's tidal fiats. "I This
pronouncement was given the force of law eight years later in Pazolt v.
Directorof the Division of Marine Fisheries,4 when the court held that
aquaculture could not be conducted on the plaintiff's intertidal property
without her permission. These cases raise important questions about the

decision-making authority of state legislatures in Massachusetts and Maine
and the role that aquaculture can play in the conservation of the clamming
industry in these states.

boats or other vessels in, or through any sea, creeks, or coves to other mens
houses or lands.
Id.
The ordinance originally pertained to residents in Massachusetts Bay Colony only.
Massachusetts Bay Colony, however, acquired the District of Maine and Plymouth Colony
in 1692. As a result of this shared history the courts have extended the rule of the Colonial
Ordinance to areas which were not within the jurisdiction of Massachusetts Bay Colony
when the ordinance was enacted. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 183 (Me. 1989)
(Wathen, J., dissenting).
In Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. (6 Tyng) 435 (1810), the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court stated that the division of public and private interests in the intertidal zone
was part of the common law of Massachusetts. Id. at 438. Eleven years after Maine
separated from Massachusetts, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law
Court, held that the Massachusetts rule applied in Maine, citing Storer. Lapish v. Bangor
Bank, 8 Me. 66, 70 (1831). Similarly, in Barker v. Bates, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 255
(1832), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that rule of the Colonial Ordinance
applied to what was Plymouth Colony. Finally, in Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441
(1882), the Law Court held that the rule extended to ancient Acadia, although that territory
was not within the District of Maine when it was acquired by Massachusetts Bay Colony.
2. 525 N.E.2d 1298 (Mass. 1988).
3. Id. at 1304.
4. 631 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994).
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This Comment will address three topics. It will begin with a discussion of the Pazolt decision in detail, examining three problems in the
analysis the court employed. It will then review the respective roles the
legislatures and judiciary have played in defining public rights in the
intertidal zone in both states. Finally, it will consider the potential for
conflict over tidal lands in Maine and suggest a means of mitigating that
concern. In the process, this Comment will argue that the legal framework pertaining to aquaculture in Maine is distinguishable from that of

Massachusetts, making the holding of Pazolt inapplicable in this state.
II. PAZOLT V. DIRECTOR OF THE DISION OF MARINE FISHERIES
In Pazolt, the plaintiff, a motel owner on Cape Cod, brought suit
against the Director of the Division of Marine Fisheries, the Town of
Truro, and John LaForte, an aquaculturist licensee, in order to prevent
LaForte from conducting aquaculture5 on her flats. 6 On cross motions for

5. John LaForte obtained a "shellfish aquaculture grant" to grow quahogs and
oysters from the Town of Truro under MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 130, § 57 (1992), which
reads in pertinent part:
PRIVATE SHELLFISH GRANTS
§ 57. Licenses granted by cities and towns...
The city council of a city or the selectmen of any town may, upon written
application therefor and after public notice and hearing thereon as provided in
section sixty, grant to any person a license for a period not exceeding ten years
to plant, grow, and take shellfish ... in such city or town at all times of the
year, in, upon or from a specific portion of flats or land under coastal waters
....

Licenses... shall be issued... upon such terms and conditions and

subject to such regulations as the city council or selectmen issuing the same
shall deem proper, but not so as to impair the private rights of any person or
to materially obstruct navigable waters ....
Id. LaForte also had a separate "shellfish aquaculture grant" under MAss. GEN. LAws ch.
130, § 68A (1992). This grant allowed him to "grow shellfish by means of racks, rafts,
or floats in waters of the commonwealth below the line of extreme low water." Id.
LaForte's activities involved a three-stage cultivation process. First, shellfish seeds
were planted in four-by-eight foot nursery trays, covered with sand, and placed on "spacer
blocks" in the area. Second, when the shellfish were grown sufficiently, they were planted
directly in the sea bottom in twelve-by-100 foot beds and covered with netting (to protect
them against natural predators), which was held down with steel bars. Finally, when they
were large enough to be harvested, they were dug up with tools such as rakes and shovels.
Brief of Defendant-Appellee John LaForte at 8, Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine
Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994) (No. SJC-06293).
6. The issue of whether Pazolt actually owned the area between the high and low
water marks in front of her motel was raised before the superior court and on appeal.
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summary judgment,7 the Superior Court held, inter alia, that: (1) LaForte

was enjoined from engaging in "aquaculture" between the high water
mark and the extreme low water mark; and, (2) with the exception of
permission to construct structures on Pazolt's land, the aquaculturist could
"plant, grow and take shellfish" in the intertidal zone within the grant
area. 8 Pazolt, LaForte and the members of the Truro Board of Selectmen
appealed. 9 In addition, an amicus curiae brief was submitted by National
Audubon Society.'"
Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d at 548-49. That issue,
however, is of no concern here. This Comment addresses the relative rights of private
landowners and the public in the intertidal zone, as defined in the Colonial Ordinance of
1641-47. For the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that Pazolt holds good title to
the flats.
7. Pazolt originally sought relief from the director of the Division of Marine
Fisheries under MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 130, § 68A (1992). Pazolt v. Director of Div. of
Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d at 549. Under the terms of that section, however, the
director may review a license only to determine "whether such license or operation
thereunder will cause any adverse effect on the shellfish or other natural resources of the
city or town." MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 130, § 68A (1992). The director denied relief.
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 3, Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631
N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994) (No. SJC-06293).
Section 68A, however, allows "[a]ny person aggrieved by the determination of the
division of marine fisheries under this section [to] appeal under the provisions of chapter
thirty A. Such right of appeal shall be exclusive." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 130, § 68A
(1992). Chapter 30A is the Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act, which provides
for judicial review of agency decisions. Consequently, Pazolt brought a claim against the
Director of the Division of Marine Fisheries in Superior Court. Pazolt v. Director of Div.
of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d at 549. The superior court dismissed the claim against
the director of the Division of Marine Fisheries because the case did not involve questions
of environmental impact. Id.
After the dismissal of the chapter 30A claim, another superior court judge treated the
case as a declaratory judgment action under MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231A, § 1 (1992).
Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d at 549. The declaratory
judgment constituted the basis of the appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
All other claims and counterclaims, which actually constituted separate actions, were
dismissed as per the parties' stipulation. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Pazolt v.
Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994) (No. SJC-06293).
8. Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d at 548.
9. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant; Brief of Defendant-Appellee John LaForte;
Brief of Cross-Appellant, the Board of Selectmen of Town of Truro, Pazolt v. Director of
Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994) (No. SJC-06293).
10. Amicus curiae briefs were submitted also by the Town of Wellfleet; John Glaze,
Dr. David Baker and Sylvia Harrison; the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; and
Conservation Law Foundation and Massachusetts Audubon Society (jointly). Pazolt v.
Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d at 548, n.4.

1997] Intertidal Zone Aquaculture and the Public Trust Doctrine

387

The success of Pazolt's argument before the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court hinged on a characterization of aquaculture as outside the
parameters of the reserved public right of fishing. The first component
of that argument was to attack the exclusivity of LaForte's license. Pazolt
asserted that the fact that the license allowed LaForte to "have the
exclusive rights to take all shellfish"" was counter to the letter and spirit
of the reservation of free fishing in the intertidal zone. Quoting dictum
in Commonwealth v. Alger, 2 Pazolt argued:
The great purpose of the Sixteenth Article of the 'body of
libertyes' ... was to declare a great principle of public right, to
abolish the forest laws, the game laws, and the laws designed to
secure several and exclusive fisheries, and to make them all free.
It expressly extended this right to places in which the tide ebbs
and flows .... 13

It is interesting to note that National Audubon Society and the Massachusetts
Audubon Society held different opinions of the case. National Audubon Society supported
LaForte, arguing that aquaculture was within the reserved public right of fishing. Brief

of Amicus Curiae National Audubon Society, Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine
Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547 (1994) (No. SC-06293). Massachusetts Audubon Society and
Conservation Law Foundation argued against LaForte's license on the narrow point that
the license authorized LaForte to use an off-road vehicle to gain access to the flats. Brief
of Amici Curiae Conservation Law Foundation and Massachusetts Audubon Society, Pazolt
v. Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547 (1994) (No. SJC-06293). Pazolt,
of course, agreed with that view. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 39, Pazolt v. Director of
Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547 (1994) (No. SJC-06293). LaForte, however,
maintained that the use of an off-road vehicle was not raised before the superior court;
therefore, it was not a proper subject to address on appeal. Brief of Defendant-Appellee
John LaForte at 23, Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547 (1994)
(No. SJC-06293). The court did not address that point. Pazolt v. Director of Div. of
Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d at 549 n.6.
11. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 130, § 63 (1992). The pertinent language reads:
§ 63. Exclusive rights of licensees...
The licensee ...

shall ...

have during the term of the license ...

exclusive

use of waters, flats or creeks described in the license, and the exclusive right
to take shellfish therefrom during the time therein specified ... ; provided,
that this section shall not be construed to authorize any taking prohibited by
law.
Id.
12. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 68 (1851).
13. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 17, Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine
Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994) (No. SJC-06293). In a footnote, however, Pazolt
maintained she was not attacking the validity of the statute on its face. Focusing on
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Pazolt thus maintained that an exclusive fishery is "contrary to long-

established property law when applied to privately held flats."14

language specifying that the provision for exclusive licenses "shall not be construed to
authorize any taking prohibited by law," MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 130, § 63 (1992), she
stated:
[The permits granted to LaForte work a taking of [Pazolt's] land because
under common law principles she owns the fee subject only to the public's right
to free fishing, fowling and navigation. LaForte cannot exercise an exclusive
right of shellfish farming on [Pazolt's] property without directly impinging
upon [Pazolt's] rights and the public rights.
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 18 n.2, Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631
N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994) (No. SJC-06293). It is unclear what Pazolt was attempting to
argue with these assertions. If the permits "work a taking" of her "land," as she asserts,
she appears to make a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment argument, which is clearly a
challenge to the statute on its face. On the other hand, if she is asserting that LaForte's
exclusive license prevents her from exercising her right, as a member of the public, to free
fishing on the flats, there is no "taking" of her land.
Pazolt renewed this "takings" argument later in her brief. In a subsequent footnote
she stated:
No license under sec. 57 is permitted "to impair the private rights of any
person"; nor may any license result in a "taking prohibited by law" ....
The
legislature went to great lengths to avoid conflicts between aquaculture and
private ownership of flats and attempts to avoid the situation of divesting
property rights with the saving language referred to above. The Truro Board
of Selectmen and DMF, by granting the aquaculture operation to LaForte in its
location of Pazolt's private flats regrettably did not follow the statute and have
in effect, taken Pazolt's property.
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 29, n.6, Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631
N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994) (No. SJC-06293) (citations omitted). If Pazolt was making a
constitutional argument under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (albeit in
footnotes), it seems she misread the statute. Section 63, pertaining to the exclusive rights
of the licensee, does state that the section "shall not be construed to authorize any taking
prohibited by law." Such a "taking," however, would appear on the basis of the context
of the statement to refer to a taking of shellfish, not a taking of property for the purposes
of a constitutional analysis. By this reading, while the statute permits an exclusive use of
the grant area under section 57, it would prohibit a town from authorizing that "taking"
of shellfish, for example, if the flats were in a grant area closed by the Division of Marine
Fisheries because of contamination.
It is possible Pazolt was misled in this matter by the court in Glaze. There, the court
quotes the language of section 57: "Licenses under this section shall be issued.., so as
[not] to impair the private rights of any person .... " It then inaccurately summarizes the
import of that language by stating: "Thus, the statute only authorizes the town to issue a
license upon privately held flats, so long as no taking or other impairment of private rights
results." Town of Wellfleet v. Glaze, 525 N.E.2d at 1301. In any case, the court in
Pazoltdid not address the issue.
14. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 19, Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine
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The second component of the argument focused on the nature of
LaForte's activities. Contrasting the verb "to fish," defined in the
Massachusetts statute as "to take or to attempt to take fish by any method
or means, whether or not such method or means results in their
capture," 5 with the term "culture," defined in Webster's Dictionary as
"the raising, improvement, or development, of some plant, animal, or
product," Pazolt wrote:
[S]hellfishing (i.e. the taking of shellfish) and shellfish farming
are diametrically opposed to each other. The act of fishing is the
same or similar to hunting, whereas, aquaculture is akin to and
the same as cultivating crops and performing animal husbandry.
Put another way, to fish is to take or capture wild animals;
aquaculture is to plant shellfish in the soil and grow them for
profit. 16
Pazolt then bolstered this assertion with dicta from a concurring opinion
in Town of Wellfleet v. Glaze,17 which stated:
Aquaculture is not fishing, nor can it legitimately be considered
a "natural derivative" of the right to fish, any more than breeding
game animals on someone else's land could properly be construed a natural derivative of the right to hunt there. Thus,
whatever rights the public has to interfere with the private
property rights of coastal owners for purposes "reasonably

Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d at 547 (Mass. 1994) (No. SJC-06293).
15. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 130, § 1 (1992). Arguably, aquaculture should be
construed as included in the definition because of the phrase "by any method or means."
16. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 25, Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine
Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994) (No. SIC-06293) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEw
UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, 2nd ed.).
Massachusetts has no statutory
definition of the term "aquaculture."
17. 525 N.E.2d 1298 (Mass. 1988). In Glaze, the defendant, the owner of tidal flats
on which aquaculture was being conducted, moored his boats at that site. When the tide
was out, the boats rested on the netting covering the shellfish, injuring or killing the
animals and tearing the mesh. The town's shellfish constable noticed the problem and
requested that the defendant move the boats. The defendant refused. The Town of
Wellfleet brought an action against the defendant, seeking an injunction. The Superior
Court granted it, under the authority of MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 214, § 7A (1986), which
permits the court to intervene if damage is occurring to the environment and that damage
results from a violation of a statute the major purpose of which is to prevent such damage.
Town of Wellfleet v. Glaze, 525 N.E.2d at 1299.
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related" to the promotion of fishing as well as navigation...
turning the tidal flats in which this defendant apparently owns the
fee into a shellfishing farm is too great an extension of the
public's right of "free fishing" to be "reasonably related" to that
right ....18
Pazolt, however, did not directly address either the "natural derivative"

standard or the requirement that an activity be "reasonably related" the
promotion of fishing. She did maintain that LaForte's placement of
"structures" on Pazolt's flats violated the rule of Locke v. Motley, 9 in

which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the right of free
fishing does not include the right "to fix stakes in the flats of a riparian
owner, for the purpose of fastening a seine across the river."' In
addition, she argued that LaForte was not entitled to use soil from her
flats for use in his nursery trays.2'
LaForte countered Pazolt's argument by invoking the public trust
doctrine.' Under that doctrine, derived from English common law, the
resources of the sea and submersible lands are a special form of property;
the state, as trustee for the people, has the responsibility of preserving
those resources, and managing them in a manner that makes them
available to all.' LaForte argued that the Colonial Ordinance codified the

18. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 38, Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine
Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994) (No. SJC-06293) (quoting Town of Wellfleet v.
Glaze, 525 N.E.2d at 1304 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (alteration in original)).
19. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 265 (1854).
20. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 35, Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine
Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994) (No. SJC-06293) (quoting Locke v. Motley, 68
Mass. (2 Gray) at 267 (1854)). See also Duncan v. Sylvester, 24 Me. 482 (1844) (member
of the public may not attach fish weirs on privately owned flats); Matthews v. Treat, 75
Me. 594 (1884) (riparian owners have the exclusive right to wharf out or to attach fish
weirs to flats, provided the structure does not interfere with the public right of navigation).
21. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 33, Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine
Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994) (No. SJC-06293) (citing Porter v. Sheehan, 73
Mass. (7 Gray) 435, 437 (1856)).
22. See generallyJoseph L. Sax, The Public TrustDoctrine in NaturalResource Law:
Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. Rv.471 (1970); The Public Trust in 27dal
Areas: A Sometime Submerged TraditionalDoctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970); Mitchell
M. Tannebaum, Comment, The Public TrustDoctrinein Maine's Submerged Lands: Public
Rights, State Obligation and the Role of the Courts, 37 ME. L. REV. 105 (1985).
23. The public trust doctrine is defined as a doctrine that: "Provides that submerged
and submersible lands are preserved for public use in navigation, fishing and recreation and
[the] state, as trustee for the people, bears [the] responsibility of preserving and protecting
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public trust doctrine at the same time that it expanded the rights of
riparian owners. u He maintained that because his grant area was barren
of shellfish, his activities would improve the resource in the town of
Truro. 5 In this way, his license was consistent with a proper exercise of
the state's public trust responsibility.
National Audubon argued that shellfish propagation was within the
reserved right of fishing, also complemented the argument of LaForte by
noting that the nursery trays and netting LaForte used were, at a minimum, "incidental to" the propagation activities.' Seeking to distinguish
the use of these materials from the stakes in Locke v. Motley,2' National
Audubon wrote that the case would not "bear the weight [Pazolt] places
on it." 28 National Audubon argued that the court in that case was interpreting a regulation pertaining to the Mystic River, not the Colonial
Ordinance.29 In addition, it pointed out that the court in Locke stated that
a public right to fasten stakes in the flats would exist in the event of "a
necessity for doing so in order to... exercise.., the right of fishery. "30
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that "the
portion of the judge's order which permit[ted] LaForte to plant and grow
shellfish on the plaintiff's tidal flats above the line of extreme low water

the right of the public to the use of the waters for those purposes." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1232 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Oregon Shores Conservation Coalition v. Oregon
Fish and Wildlife Comm'n, 662 P.2d 356, 364 (Or. App. 1983)). See also Boston
Waterfront Development Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 358 (Mass. 1979)
("Throughout history, the shores of the sea have been recognized as a special form of
property of unusual value; and therefore subject to different legal rules from those which
apply to inland property.").
24. Brief of Defendant-Appellee John LaForte at 15, Pazolt v. Director of Div. of
Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994) (No. SJC-06293).
25. Id. at 16. LaForte could have extended that argument further. Instead of arguing
that he would improve the resource in Truro by planting on barren flats, he should have
argued that the reproductive biology of the clam acts to propagate the species well beyond
the flats in which they are planted. See infra Part iIM.B.
26. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Audubon Society at 12-13, Pazolt v. Director
of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994) (No. SJC-06293).
27. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 265 (1854).
28. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Audubon Society at 14, Pazolt v. Director of
Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994) (No. SJC-06293).
29. Id. at 14-15.
30. Id. (quoting Locke v. Motley, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 267 (alteration in original)).
See also Brief of Defendant-Appellee John LaForte at 20, Pazolt v. Director of Div. of
Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994) (No. SIC-06293).

392

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:383

[wals in error."31 It reached that determination by employing the following line of reasoning. The court noted that "the private property rights of
coastal owners in the tidal area may be subordinate to the public's right
if the public purposes are reasonably related to the protection or promo-

tion of fishing or navigation. "32 It then examined the statutory definition
of the verb "to fish" 33 and compared it to the common definition of the
verb "to farm,' employing the distinction between capture and cultiva-

tion that Pazolt emphasized. Finally, it described the means of classifying
activities reasonably related to the public's right to fish as those that are
"necessary or incidental to the right to fish. "3 It then concluded that:
"Aquaculture is a contemporary method of farming shellfish ....
[I]t is
not incidental to or reasonably
related
to
or
a
natural
derivative
of
the
36
public's right to fish."
There are three problems with the court's analysis. First, the court
refused to address a critical issue to LaForte's position: whether or not the
public's reserved right to fish in the intertidal zone, guaranteed by the

common law and the public trust doctrine, embraces aquaculture.
Second, the court created a categorical rule concerning aquaculture in an
imprecise fashion. Third, and most problematic, the court's convoluted
reasoning obscures a fundamental flaw in the way the court has applied
the "tests" of what activities are within the scope of the public's right to
fish. These problems suggest that the court was predisposed to construe
the public right of fishing very narrowly.

31. Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d at 548.
32. Id. at 551.
33. See supra text accompanying note 15.
34. The verb "to farm" is defined as: "[To grow or cultivate in quantity < shellfish>." Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d at 551 (quoting
WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 450 (9th ed. 1991)).

In addition, the court

noted the noun "farm" is defined as: "[A] tract of water reserved for the artificial
cultivation of some aquatic food; as an oyster farm." Id. (quoting WEBsTER's THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 824 (1961)).
35. Id. In a footnote, the court states that the test for determining whether an activity
is protected by the Colonial Ordinance has been "variously described." Id. at n.9 (citing
Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561 (1974) (public has reserved right to fish and any
"natural derivative" thereof)); Crocker v. Champlin, 89 N.E. 129 (1909) (public right
extends so far as is "reasonably necessary" in the interests of navigation); Town of
Wellfleet v. Glaze, 525 N.E.2d 1298, 1304 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (public right
may interfere with private rights if it is "reasonably related" to or a "natural derivative"
of the right to fish).
36. Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d at 551.
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In failing to address the argument LaForte raised concerning the
public trust doctrine, if even to dismiss it, the court side-stepped a major
principle in the law of property affecting intertidal lands. Despite
frequent descriptions in prior cases of the nature of the state's responsibility as a "trust" with respect to the public's rights,"3 the court did not use
the term even once. By this omission, the court effectively reduced the
issue to a question of 3applying ancient notions of public rights to a
"contemporary" activity. " In the process, it ignored the commonwealth's
contemporary responsibility to manage the people's shellfish resource
effectively.

It also overlooked the possibility that the Massachusetts

Legislature, in deciding not to condition aquaculture on the permission of
the riparian owner, implicitly assumed that aquaculture is within the scope
of the public right of fishing. By excluding an analysis of the public trust
doctrine, the court also compounded the other two problems in its
decision.

37. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 83 (1851)
("[W]hether this power [to regulate] be traced to the right of property or right of
sovereignty as its principal source, it must be regarded as held in trust for the best interest
of the public ....").
38. Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d at 551. The court
tacitly rejected two arguments that the term "aquaculture" is merely a new name for an old
activity. LaForte presented evidence before the superior court that planting and raising
oysters in the tidelands dated to the early eighteenth century in Massachusetts. Brief of
Defendant-Appellee John LaForte at 6-7, Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries,
631 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994) (No. SJC-06293) (citing an affidavit in the record from
Professor David T. Konig, a professor of history at Washington University in St. Louis,
Missouri). In addition, National Audubon Society argued that language in Howes v. Town
of Barnstable, 189 N.E. 34 (Mass. 1934), though dicta, was:
The issue in that case was whether the holder of an expired shellfish grant had
the right to interfere with the general public right to collect shellfish. The
court ruled the plaintiff had no such right because his exclusive grant had
expired. However, the decision goes on to describe how the plaintiff worked
his former exclusive shellfish grant, including the fact that he "brought from
the mainland several loads of marsh turf and mud to provide a rough surface
on his grant and on adjoining grant," that he "also planted several patches of
thatch to form islands and break up tidal currents," and he "planted in long
furrows, which he made with a handplow, many bushels of clams."
Brief of amicus curiae National Audubon Society at 15-16, Pazolt v. Director of Div. of
Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994) (No. SJC-06293) (quoting Howes v.
Town of Barnstable, 189 N.E. at 34).
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In borrowing dicta from Town of Welfleet v. Glaze 9 to create a

categorical rule in Pazolt, the court failed to consider the fact that the
legal issues presented in those cases are distinguishable. In Glaze, the
Town of Wellfleet sought an injunction to prevent a littoral property
owner from mooring his boats on a town-approved aquaculture site. The
superior court ultimately granted the injunction,' a decision that apparently spurred the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to pick up the
case sua sponte. The Town argued on appeal that the superior court had
the statutory authority to issue the injunction if the court found that
damage to the environment was occurring or about to occur, and that the
damage resulted from a violation of a statute the major purpose of which
was to prevent or minimize damage to the environment.4" The Massachu-

setts Supreme Judicial Court ruled for Glaze, however, concluding that
the major purpose of the statute pertaining to the prevention of damage to
shellfish in aquaculture sites 42 was not to prevent "damage to the
environment" within the meaning of the statute authorizing injunctions.43

39. 525 N.E.2d at 1304. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18 for Justice
O'Connor's comments.
40. The Town of Welifleet initially sought a temporary restraining order against
Glaze, which the superior court granted. The Town then applied for a preliminary
injunction, which the court denied. Several months later the Town moved for summary
judgment on its claim for injunctive relief. The superior court granted the motion,
permanently enjoining Glaze from mooring his boats at the site. Glaze appealed,
apparently to an intermediate-level court. Id. at 1299.
41. Id. at 1300. The statutory basis for the injunction reads in pertinent part:
The superior court for the county in which damage to the environment is
occurring or is about to occur may, upon a civil action in which equitable or
declaratory relief is sought ... by any political subdivision of the commonwealth, determine whether such damage is occurring or is about to occur and
may, before the final determination of the action, restrain the person causing
or about to cause such damage; provided ...that the damage ... constitutes
a violation of a statute, ordinance, by-law or regulation the major purpose of
which is to prevent or minimize damage to the environment.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 7A (1986).
42. MAss. GEN. LAWS, ch. 130, § 67 (1986) reads in pertinent part:
Whoever works a dredge, oyster tongs or rakes, or any other implement for the
taking of shellfish of any description upon any shellfish grounds or beds
covered by a license granted under section fifty-seven . . . or in any way
disturbs the growth of shellfish thereon ...without the consent of the licensee
...shall for the first offense be punished by a fine ....
See supra note 5 for the text of MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 130, § 57 (1992), authorizing
licenses for shellfish aquaculture.
43. Town of Wellfleet v. Glaze, 525 N.E.2d at 1300-01. The court wrote:
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It is against this backdrop of facts and issues, which did not involve the
question of whether aquaculture is within the scope of the reserved public

rights in the intertidal zone, that Justice O'Connor wrote in a concurring
opinion that "[a]quaculture is not fishing."' Under the circumstances
presented in the case, his comments are obiterdicta of the most gratuitous
sort.
While Pazolt ultimately did turn on the question of whether aquaculture should be construed as within the public right of fishing,45 it need not

have. In its hasty application of Justice O'Connor's statements in Glaze,
the Pazolt court overlooked the other aspect of the Glaze decision.
Quoting Chief Justice Shaw, the Glaze court summarized the balance

between public and private rights in the intertidal zone:
Looking at the terms of [the Colonial Ordinance], and the purposes for which it was intended, the object seems to have been,

to secure to riparian proprietors in general, without special grant,
a property in the land ...subordinate only to a reasonableuse
of the same by other individual riparian proprietors and the

public .... I
The town has not demonstrated that the major purpose of [section 67] is to
prevent or minimize damage to the environment. Although protection of
shellfishing undoubtedly provided some motivation for the enactment of the
statute... it cannot be that the major purpose behind § 67 is the protection of
the environment because it is the consent of the licensee that determines
whether the conduct described is within the statutory sanction. If the
Legislature in enacting § 67 was primarily motivated by a desire to protect the
natural resources of the Commonwealth, it surely would not have limited the
statutory sanction to acts done without the licensee's permission.
Id. There is at least an argument that the purpose of § 67 is to prevent damage to the
environment in that aquaculture can function as a conservation measure. But see id. at
1302 (Wilkins, J., concurring) (stating that "damage to the environment" for the purposes
of section 7A involves adverse effects on the air, water or land, not animals).
44. Id. Justice O'Connor would have held that the superior court had the authority
to issue the injunction under its general equity powers, but that the town did not
demonstrate the right to an injunction on the merits. Id. at 1302.
45. Pazolt asserted, despite her argument that aquaculture should not be construed
as within the public right of fishing, that she was not "attacking the validity of the statutory
scheme on its face. . . ." Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 18 n.2, Pazolt v. Director of
Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994) (No. SJC-06293). This curious
statement appears to contradict the premise of her argument. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
46. Town of Wellfleet v. Glaze, 525 N.E.2d at 1302 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush. 53, 89 (1851) (emphasis added).
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The court, then, could have concluded simply that LaForte's activities

were not reasonable in light of Pazolt's commercial expectations. Instead,
it created a rule of law that has negative consequences for the future of
aquaculture.
The most egregious problem, however, is the court's application of
the "tests" to determine if an activity falls within the reserved right of
fishing. These tests, according to the court, determine if an activity is
"reasonably related" to fishing, a "natural derivative" of fishing, or
"incidental to" the right of fishing.47 What the court in Pazolt ignores is
the way these issues have been addressed in the past. Although never
stated expressly, the tests have not been used interchangeably. In
particular, the "reasonably related" test, or an approximation thereof, has

been reserved for judicial evaluation of statutes affecting the public right
in the intertidal zone.4" For example, in Commonwealth v. Alger, 49
perhaps the greatest exposition of the relationship between public and
private right in the intertidal zone, the court ruled that the Massachusetts
Legislature had the authority to establish a line in Boston Harbor beyond
which riparian owners could not extend their wharves because the law was
a "reasonable regulation" related to the public right of navigation.5" On
the other hand, the "incidental to" test, such as it is, 51 seems to reflect the

courts' efforts to determine if an activity is necessary in order to engage
in the public right to fish where no statute has explicitly authorized the

47. Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d at 551.
48. Evaluation of whether a statute is "reasonably related" to the promotion of
fishing or navigation echoes the substantive due process test to determine if a police power
action is constitutional. It also echoes the takings test to determine if a regulation goes
"too far." See Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987). The Orion court notes
that the tests seem analytically identical. Id. at 1076-1077.
49. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851).
50. Id. at 104.
51. There is good reason to conclude that no such "test" exists. The court in Pazolt,
in fact, cites no authority for the test. There have been references to "incidental" rights
in the case law, however. See, e.g., Weston v. Sampson, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 347, 353
(1851) ("[Bly the charters of Charles I. and James I.... all the rights to the sea and seashores, with the incidental rights of fishing, were granted to the colonists."); Butler v.
Attorney General, 80 N.E. 688, 689 (Mass. 1907) ("In the seashore the entire property,
under the colonial ordinance, is in the individual, subject to the public rights.... Among
these is, of course, the right of navigation, with such incidental rights as pertain thereto.")
(citations omitted). Because the Pazolt court appears to apply an "incidental to" test, it is
treated as such.
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activity. 2 Thus, in Bany v. Grela,53 the court concluded that the public
has the right to cross private tidal flats to reach a public jetty in order to
fish from that jetty, presumably because in the absence of such an
incidental right, the public right is meaningless. Similarly, in Weston v.
Sampson,54 in ruling that the right to fish included the right to take
shellfish, the court did not bar the defendants from landing a boat on the
flats, presumably because without the incidental right of landing on the
flats, the defendants would have no access to exercise their right to take
shellfish.
In contrast to the other two "tests," which at least have some ancient
language to support their application, it is clear that the "natural derivative" test is a recent invention. That language is used first in the 1974
Opinion of the Justices,55 in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court evaluated a pending bill before the legislature that would have
guaranteed the public a right of passage by foot in the intertidal zone.
After noting that previous cases affirmed the rule that riparian property
owners hold the tidelands in fee, the Opinion of the Justices court stated:
"If, therefore, the right of passage authorized by the bill is, as it declares,
merely an exercise of existing public rights, and not a taling of private
property, it must be a natural derivative of the rights preserved by the
colonial ordinance." 56 The court then concluded that the bill would57
constitute a talking under the Massachusetts and U.S. constitutions.
Justice O'Connor, writing his concurring opinion in Glaze, cited the

52. "Incidental" is defined as: "Depending upon or appertaining to something else
as primary; something necessary, appertaining to, or depending upon another which is
termed the principal .... " BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 762 (6th ed. 1990). "Rights,"
according to the same text, "may ... be described as either primary or secondary.
Primaryrights are those which can be created without reference to rights already existing.
Secondary rights can only arise for the purpose of protecting or enforcing primary rights."
Id. at 1324.
53. 361 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
54. 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) at 355.
55. 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (Mass. 1974). Advisory opinions of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court reflect the opinions of the individual justices. They are not binding
for stare decisis purposes. See Opinion of the Justices, 366 N.E.2d 733 (Mass. 1977);
Mayor of Somerville v. District Court of Somerville, 57 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1944); Woods
v. City of Woburn, 107 N.E. 985 (Mass. 1915).
56. Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 566.
57. Id. at 568-71.

398

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:383

"natural derivative" language as though it were a binding standard.5' The
Pazolt court then uncritically adopted it. 9
In its application of these tests, the Pazolt court in effect subjected

LaForte's activities to two separate tests, one of which should not have
been applied at all. To be consistent with Chief Justice Shaw's opinion in
Commonwealth v. Alger,60 the court should have decided whether aquacul-

ture, which was authorized by statute, was reasonably related to the
promotion of fishing or a reasonable regulation of fishing; it should not
have considered whether it was "reasonably related to the public's right
to fish.

61

If the court found that aquaculture was reasonably related to

the promotion of fishing or a reasonable regulation of fishing, the inquiry
should have ended there.6' Furthermore, had the court given any consid-

eration to LaForte's public trust argument, it may have been forced to the
conclusion that aquaculture licensing is within the state's authority as an
exercise of its public trust responsibility. Instead, the court subjected
LaForte's activities to an additional test: whether aquaculture was
"necessary or incidental to the right to fish."'6 Because aquaculture is not
"incidental to" the right to fish, in that theoretically shellfishing could
occur without aquaculture, 64 the court was not obliged to hold that
aquaculture passed the test.
The irony of the Pazolt court's analysis is that had it scrutinized
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Glaze, it would have found an internal
inconsistency. Despite his pronouncement that aquaculture is not fishing,
Justice O'Connor concluded that: "[A]Ithough the general public's

58. Town of Wellfleet v. Glaze, 525 N.E.2d at 1304.
59. Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Mass.
1994).
60. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851).
61. Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d at 551.
62. In conducting that inquiry, the court might have considered the following dictum
from Commonwealth v. Alger for its persuasive authority.
Whether any restraint upon the use of land is necessary to the preservation of
common rights and the public security, must depend upon circumstances, to be
judged of by those to whom all legislative power is intrusted by the sovereign
authority of the state, so to declare and regulate as to secure and preserve all
public rights.
Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 88.
63. Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d at 551.
64. But see supra note 25 and accompanying text for LaForte's argument that the
flats in question were barren of shellfish prior to his shellfish grant. See also Part EL.B
for the argument that aquaculture is an effective conservation measure.
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shellfishing rights in the defendant's tidal flats are presently exercised
exclusively by a private party, the licensee ....

his license is granted to

serve the public interest in replenishing the shellfisheries, not for the
private benefit of the licensee. "I Thus, Justice O'Connor conceded that
the aquaculturist's activities would protect and promote fishing, which is
enough to pass the "reasonably related" test. To avoid the inherent
contradictions in the Massachusetts court's analysis of clam aquaculture,
Maine courts, if faced with a similar situation, should reject the Pazolt
analysis and formulate a distinguishable legal theory concerning the
relationship between shellfish aquaculture and the public right of fishing.
m. DISTINGUISHING SHELLFISH AQUACULTURE IN MAINE

Underlying the discussion in the previous section is the question of
which branch of the government should decide the scope of public rights
in the intertidal zone. Historically, the courts have been deferential to the
legislatures in this area. For example, in the great case of Commonwealth
v. Alger,66 in which the court considered whether the Massachusetts
Legislature could limit the length of wharves extending into Boston
harbor, Chief Justice Shaw wrote:
[C]onsidering that sea-shore estate, though held in fee by the riparian
proprietor, both on account of the qualified reservation under which
the grant was made, and the peculiar nature and character, position
and relations of the estate, and the great public interests associated
with it,

. . .

the court are of opinion that the legislature has power

•.. .to make reasonable regulations, declaring the public right, and
providing for its preservation by reasonable restraints, and to enforce
these restraints by suitable penalties. 67

65. Town of Wellfleet v. Glaze, 525 N.E.2d 1298, 1303 (Mass. 1988) (O'Connor,

J., concurring) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor also cited dictum
from Commonwealth v. Hilton: "[I]t is not to be assumed that the Legislature would grant
exclusive fishing rights except to promote the public interest." Id. (citing Commonwealth
v. Hilton, 54 N.E. 362, 364 (Mass. 1899). Accord Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062
(Wash. 1987). The Orion court noted that Washington regulations identified aquaculture
as "a preferred, water-dependent use" deserving of protection from other activities which
when '[p]roperly managed ...can result in long term over short term benefit' 'of statewide and national interest."' Id. at 1066 n.4 (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
66. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851).

67. Id. at 95.
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The Pazolt court, however, ignored the Legislature's historic perogative
as it pertains to the public right of fishing. Given the Massachusetts
court's unwillingness to consider the implications of legislative responsi-

bility under the public trust doctrine, an analysis of both the statutes and
prior cases is necessary to outline how Maine courts, ordinarily inclined
to follow Massachusetts decisions,6" can distinguish the role aquaculture
can play in the preservation of the shellfish industry and the public right

of fishing in this state.
A. The Leasing Statutes
The Maine statutes pertaining to aquaculture are fundamentally
different from the Massachusetts statute. First, in contrast to Massachusetts, Maine has a statutory definition of aquaculture: "'Aquaculture'

means the culture or husbandry of marine organisms by any person."69
While this definition does not refer to fishing,70 it does suggest that the
Maine Legislature has developed a cogent policy with respect to aquaculture. Should, for example, a Pazolt issue be raised before the Maine

Supreme Judicial Court, the justices would not be consulting a common
dictionary to glean what the Legislature contemplated with respect to that
activity. 7 Second, unlike Massachusetts, Maine municipalities cannot
authorize aquaculturel until they have enacted municipal shellfish
68. See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).
69. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6001(1) (West 1994).
70. "The verb 'fish' means to take or attempt to take any marine organism by any
method or means." Id. § 6001(17). Arguably, aquaculture is contained within the scope
of the verb "fish" by the use of the phrase "by any method or means."
71. In Pazolt, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court relied on Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary to define the word "farm." See supra notes 15-18, 33-34 and
accompanying text.
72. The municipal leasing statute reads in pertinent part:
A municipality, which has established a shellfish conservation program as
provided under section 6671, may lease areas in the intertidal zone to the
extreme low water mark, within the municipality for the purpose of shellfish
aquaculture.
2. Department procedure for review and approval. The commissioner shall
use the same procedure and the same grounds for approval as required for
aquaculture leases under section 6072 [leasing through the Department of
Marine Resources], except:
A.
Preference shall be given to municipal leases;
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conservation programs. 73 In effect, the Maine Legislature has decided that
aquaculture, which can only be conducted as part of a conservation
program, is a viable conservation measure.
Maine defines the term "conservation" as "providing for the development and wise utilization of the state's marine resources, protecting the
ultimate supply for present and future generations, preventing waste and
implementing sound management programs."7 4 Although it is not stated
explicitly, this is a codification of the public trust doctrine as related to
marine resources; it outlines the state's responsibilities in a manner that
is consistent with that doctrine. While the existence of that doctrine has

never been questioned judicially, and has in fact been construed explicitly

C.

The municipality may establish conditions and limits on the

lease ....

ME.

tit. 12, § 6673 (West 1994).
Section 6072 authorizes the commissioner of the Department of Marine Resources
to lease areas of the intertidal zone for scientific research or for aquaculture of marine
RFv. STAT. ANN.

organisms. Leases are conditioned on the permission of the littoral property owner. Id.
§ 6072(4)(F) (requiring written permission of "every riparian owner whose land to the low
water mark will be actually used"). Because section 6673 requires the commissioner, in
evaluating municipal leases, to use "the same grounds for approval as required for
aquaculture leases under section 6072," municipal leasing is also conditioned on the
permission of the littoral owner.
73. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6671 (West 1994) provides:
1. Municipal funds. Any municipality may, by vote of its legislative body,
raise and appropriate money for the implementation of a shellfish conservation

program.
3. Shellfish conservation ordinance. Within any area of the municipality, a
shellfish conservation ordinance may regulate or prohibit the possession of
shellfish; may fix the amount of shellfish that may be taken; ... and may
authorize the municipal officers to open and close flats under specified
conditions ....
4. Adoption requirements. Shellfish conservation ordinances may be adopted
under this section by municipalities or unorganized townships.
B. Any ordinance proposed by a municipality or unorganized territory
under this section must be approved in writing by the commissioner
prior to its adoption.
Id.
74. Id. § 6001(9). Massachusetts does not define the word "conservation" in MASS.
ch. 130 (1994).

GEN. LAws,
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as applying to marine resources, 5 the language of the statutes implies that
aquaculture should be construed as within the public right of fishing. In
fact, the history of the Maine Legislature's actions with respect to

conservation of marine resources bears out this interpretation.
B. Legislative Efforts to Conserve the Fisheries.
In acting to conserve marine resources, the Massachusetts and Maine
Legislatures have defined the scope of public rights in the intertidal zone
also. (In fact, the Colonial Ordinance, the subject of much analysis and

interpretation since its enactment in 1641, is an example of the authority
of the legislative body to designate private and public rights in tidal areas.)

Maine's statute authorizing municipal leasing of tidal flats for aquaculture
is consistent with both the authority of the legislature to conserve the
resource under the public trust doctrine and with legislative authority to

define the scope of public rights in that zone.
Prior to Maine becoming a separate state in 1820, statutes enacted in
Massachusetts applied to the District of Maine. As early as 1765, the

province of Massachusetts enacted a law prohibiting the taking of oysters
without a permit from the selectmen of the town where the taking oc-

curred.76 That statute remained in force until 1795, when a similar law
regulating the fishery was enacted.7 7 The legislative body also created
laws pertaining to specific localities. For example, under a 1793 statute,
the citizens of Hamilton could "improv[e] the clam banks.-"7 In no case,

75. James v. Inhabitants of West Bath, 437 A.2d 863, 865 (Me. 1981) ("A consistent
theme in the decisional law is the concept that Maine's tidal lands and resources ... are
held by the state in a public trust for the people of the State.. . ."); See also Opinion of
the Justices, 437 A.2d 597 (Me. 1981).
76. The statute of February 28, 1765, is cited in Keene v. Gifford, 32 N.E. 946, 947
(Mass. 1893) as 4 Prov. Laws, p. 743.
77. Keene v. Gifford, 32 N.E. 946, 947 (Mass. 1893). The court notes in Keene,
that "no provision was made, until 1848, by which, if an individual artificially created
oyster beds on public flats, he could be protected in their enjoyment, and allowed to take
oysters from them at pleasure." Id.
It was the 1848 statute at issue in Keene. In that case the defendant had a license to
plant oysters in a given area of Bourne, Massachusetts which expired in June of 1889.
Although he applied for a renewal of the license, he did not pick it up. The selectmen
subsequently issued a license to the plaintiff in April of 1890. The court ruled that the
plaintiff had the exclusive use of the flats because the defendant had allowed his license to
expire.
78. Commonwealth v. Bailey, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 541, 543 (1866). The court notes
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however, was the power of the legislative body to make laws pertaining
to the resource successfully challenged.
The bifurcation of authority evident in the earliest statutes, in which
the legislative body delegated part of its responsibility concerning marine
resource to the towns, was duplicated in Maine after it separated from
Massachusetts. A few examples will suffice to illustrate the point. One
of the earliest post-statehood acts, passed in March of 1821, was named
"An Act for the preservation of certain Fish."79 It provided penalties for
destroying shellfish or willfully obstructing their growth and granted
towns the authority to issue permits to take shellfish at the times and in the
quantities the selectmen deemed reasonable. It also created exceptions for
family use, bait, and native Indians.' An 1883 Act similarly regulated the
taking of clams. Named "An Act to regulate the taking of shell fish or
clams,""' it created, however, exceptions for bait, personal consumption,
and hotel owners but did not provide an exception for Indians. Clearly,
in creating a new exception for hotel owners and eliminating the exception
for Indians, the Legislature had and exercised the authority to define
public rights in the intertidal zone.
Contrary to Pazolt's arguments concerning a several fishery,8 the
legislative bodies of both Massachusetts and Maine have recognized that
granting exclusive use of a fishery can serve the interests of conservation
and is within legislative authority. Massachusetts recognized that principle at least as early as 1848, when it granted exclusive licenses to cultivate
oysters. 13 In Maine, the legislature enacted the first fish culture statute in
1889.1 It authorized towns to appropriate money for the propagation of
fish shortly thereafter; in 1893.1 By 1905, the legislature granted the
commissioner of the Department of Sea and Shore Fisheries authority to
appropriate up to $1,000 to conduct experiments in shellfish cultivation.
Named "An Act for the encouragement, development and conservation of
the Shellfish Industry," it also allowed individuals to engage in cultivation
if they had the permission of the riparian owners whose fiats would be
that this statute pertained to the division of the Town of Ipswich into the Town of Ipswich
and the Town of Hamilton and that the right created by the statute is undefined. Id.
79. 1821 Me. Laws 179.
80. Id.
81. 1883 Me. Acts 178.
82. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 77.
84. 1889 Me. Laws 254.
85. 1893 Me. Laws 151.
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used.86 The Maine Legislature continued to appropriate money for such

experiments for a number of years thereafter.
What the members of the legislature apparently knew is that cultivation results in conservation by replenishing the resource. This fact is
evident both in the statements regarding the purposes of cultivation

statutes, and in the statements of courts evaluating those statutes. For
example, in Keene v. Gifford,"'the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
observed:
The facts that the place licensed is not to contain a natural oyster

bed, and the low price charged in fees, make it apparent that the
purpose of the statute is to encourage the artificial propagation of
oysters .... It is naturally to be expected that the presence of

oysters for a number of years in any locality will tend to make,
in the vicinity, extensive and valuable beds.88
As mentioned above, Justice O'Connor also conceded this point in his
concurring opinion in Glaze.8 9 In fact, cultivation, or aquaculture in
modem parlance, does replenish the resource. In the case of clams, their
fertilized eggs develop into free swimming larvae. These larvae can be
scattered widely from their parents' spawning grounds, due to tidal action

and water currents. 9° Thus, an aquaculturist may indeed "farm" the

86. 1905 Me. Laws 88. The statute read in pertinent part:
Section 2. Said commissioner... may, for the purposes of this act, take any
shore rights, flats and waters not exceeding an area of two acres ... in the
prosecution of the work of fish culture and scientific research relative to
shellfish ....
Section 3. The commissioner, upon the application of any person or corporation interested or engaged in scientific research relating to shellfish... or in
the cultivation and development of the shellfish industry for economic purposes
• ..shall, after being satisfied ... that the applicant either owns or has the
consent, so far as the same can be granted, of the owner of the flats, shore
rights and waters where such work is to be undertaken .... give notice of a
hearing. . . and if, upon such hearing, the commissioner is satisfied that the
interests of the state will be promoted by such experiments [shall set aside up
to one acre for that purpose].
Id.
87. 32 N.E. 946 (Mass. 1893).
88. Id. at 947.
89. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
90. See ROBERT L. Dow & DANA E. WALLACE, DEPARTMENT OF SEA AND SHORE
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shellfish he plants in the flats. Unlike the traditional breeder of farm
animals, however, he has no control over their offspring. Instead, he is
returning those offspring to the wild, making them available to the public
for capture.
C. JudicialEvaluation of Legislative Enactments
In reviewing the numerous cases addressing public rights in the
intertidal zone, it is a mistake to look solely at the holdings in order to
understand the scope of those rights. In many if not most cases, the
courts evaluated challenges to statutes. Because of these factual bases, a
recitation of the holdings does not accurately reflect judicial evaluation of
legislative authority in the intertidal zone. It is therefore necessary to
examine the situations under which the courts upheld statutory authority
to affect private and public rights in tidal lands.
Where the courts have concluded that a legislative enactment is
designed to preserve public rights, the statutes for the most part have been
upheld. For example, in Inhabitantsof Stoughton v. Baker," the Massachusetts Legislature authorized, via a resolution, that an alteration be
made in a sluiceway in a dam in Dorchester. The defendant dam-owners
refused to make the alteration, arguing that the legislature had no authority to pass the resolve. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the
resolve was constitutional, noting that the right to build the dam was
subject to certain limitations, one of which was to protect the rights of the
public in the fishery "so that the dam must be so constructed that the fish
should not be interrupted in their passage up the river to cast their
spawn."' Conversely, where the legislature has not acted to curtail
public rights, they cannot be abridged. In Inhabitants of Arundel v.
McCulloch,93 the town built a bridge over the Kennebec River between

FISHERiEs, THE STORY OF THE MAINE CLAM 8

(1950).

91. 4 Mass. (4 Tyng) 522 (1808).

92. Id. at 528. It is interesting to note that Stoughton, the defendant dam-owner, was
granted the right to build the mill and dam in 1634.

No fish way was constructed,

however, until 1789, more than 150 years later. It was at that point that the sluiceway,
which the legislature concluded required alteration, was built. In vindicating the public
rights, the court stated: "This limitation [pertaining to making the fish accessible to the
public], being for the benefit of the public, is not extinguished by any inattention or
neglect, in compelling the owner to comply with it. For no laches can be imputed to the
government, and against it no time runs so as to bar its rights." Id.
93. 10 Mass. (10 Tyng) 70 (1813).
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Arundel and Wells without legislative authority to do so. The defendant,
sailing his vessel up the Kennebec, removed a part of the bridge in order
to pass through. The court concluded the defendant committed no
trespass, because the town could not interfere with the public right of
navigation in the absence of legislative approval.' In another vindication
of the public right of navigation, the court in Commonwealth v. Alger95
wrote:
[N-one but the sovereign power can authorize an interruption of
such passages, because it has power to judge of what the public
convenience requires, and may enact conditions to preserve the
natural passages; ... all navigable rivers are public property, for
the use of all the citizens; and there must be some act of the
sovereign power, direct or derivative, to authorize any interrup96
tion of them.
Thus, with respect to preserving public rights, the courts have repeatedly
upheld legislative authority.
Likewise, the courts have also upheld legislative authority to alter
public rights of navigation and fishing if it is in the interests of the state
to do so. The court in InhabitantsofArundel v. McCulloch,97 for example, stated that had town been authorized by the legislature to construct
the bridge, it would have found a trespass.98 In Parker v. The Cutler
Milldam Company99 the court wrote: "The regulation of the navigable
waters within the State is vested in the sovereign power to be exercised by
laws duly enacted. The navigation may be impeded, if in the judgment of

94. Id. In a factual circumstance similar to that in Stoughton, the bridge had been
in use for fifty years. Nevertheless, the court wrote:
It is an unquestionable principle of the common law, that all navigable waters
belong to the sovereign, or in other words, to the publick; and that no
individual or corporation can appropriate them to their own use, or confine or
obstruct them, so as to impair the passage over them without authority from the
legislative power.
Id. at 71.
95. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851).
96. Id. at 79 (summarizing the conclusion of the court in Commonwealth v.
Inhabitants of Charlestown, 18 Mass. 184, 1 Pick. 180 (1822)).
97. 10 Mass. (10 Tyng) 70 (1813).
98. Id. at 71. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
99. 20 Me. 353 (1841).
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that power the public good requires it."" ° With respect to fishing, the
courts have approved legislative power to modify the scope of public
rights as well. In construing the Colonial Ordinance in Commonwealth v.
Bailey,10' the court stated:
But this [ordinance] did not... confer on the inhabitants of the
several towns as existing in 1641 a right of property in the
fisheries in their respective limits. It simply declared the public
right of fishing, in the absence of any law, regulation or grant to
restrain it. The qualification "unless the freemen of the same
town or the general court have otherwise appropriated them" is
not a mere specific exception of privileges previously granted;
but a general law, prescribing by what authority this public right
may be regulated or granted away."
In addition, the courts have repeatedly upheld the authority of towns,
granted by statute, to discriminate against non-residents. 3 Such discrimination is surely a modification of public rights, which had its genesis in
4
the Colonial Ordinance itself.1
What could be characterized as the ultimate form of discrimination,
i.e., granting exclusive rights to individuals that the public would ordinarily be able to exercise, has been upheld by the courts as well. Thus,
in Commonwealth v. Manimon, 05 the court upheld a conviction of the
defendant who dug quahogs in beds designated for a licensee's exclusive
use. The court wrote:
100. Id. at 357. In Parker,the defendant corporation was granted authority to
construct a dam at the head of a harbor in Cutler. The plaintiff alleged that the dam
interfered with the right to navigate the river. The court held that though the dam did alter
the flux of the tide, the legislature had the power to alter the public right of navigation.
101. 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 541 (1866).
102. Id. at 542. In Bailey the court held that the general law requiring permits to
take clams applied in the town of Ipswich.
103. See, e.g., State v. Lemar, 87 A.2d 886 (Me. 1952) (statute allowing towns to
exclude non-residents from worm-digging upheld); State v. Leavitt, 72 A. 875 (Me. 1909)
(statute allowing Scarborough to exclude non-residents from harvesting shellfish upheld);
Commonwealth v. Hilton, 54 N.E. 362 (Mass. 1899) (statute allowing towns to exclude
non-residents from harvesting shellfish upheld). But see State v. Norton, 335 A.2d 607
(Me. 1975) (town ordinance excluding non-residents must be based on findings of fact that
such ordinance will protect shellfish from over-harvesting).
104. The ordinance limited free fishing to householders exercising that right in the
town in which they lived. See THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAUuEs supra note 1.
105. 136 Mass. (22 Lath.) 456 (1884).
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Th[e] statute provided for the planting of artificial oyster beds
under a license from the selectmen of towns, and gave to persons
licensed the exclusive use, for that purpose, of the flats assigned
to them, and an action of trespass . . . and in addition thereto
imposed... a fine... for each offence.
It seems plain, from an examination of these statutes, that
when the Legislature provided for private ownership in oyster
beds, there ceased to be any public or common right to take
oysters from such beds, and the provisions intended to regulate
the exercise of the common right do not apply to them .... 06

In a similar Massachusetts case, 10 7 the court declared: "The power of the
legislature to determine the mode of use of fisheries in the public interest,
even to the granting of exclusive rights of fishing to individuals, has been
broadly stated by the courts, and frequently exercsed." 108 Maine authority
for the same proposition is stated in State v. Leavitt: "[T]he great weight
of authority and judicial expression is to the effect that the state in the
exercise of its power of regulation and control may grant exclusive rights
of fishery to individuals." °0 The assumption underlying these statements
and the statutes to which they pertain was explained in Commonwealth v.
Hilton: "It is not to be assumed that a Legislature would undertake to
grant exclusive rights, except on the ground that the interests of the public
would thereby be promoted." 110 Thus, the courts in both Massachusetts
and Maine have uniformly affirmed that it is within the legislatures' power
to determine the scope of rights in tidal lands if the public interest is
served by their decisions.
D. The Law Court's Construction of PublicRights
There is a good argument that the Maine Law Court has construed
public rights in the intertidal zone more liberally than the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court."' For example, the Law Court has stated that

106. Id. at 457.
107. Commonwealth v. Hilton, 54 N.E. 362 (Mass. 1899).
108. Id. at 363-64.
109. State v. Leavitt, 72 A. 875, 877 (Me. 1909).
110. Commonwealth v. Hilton, 54 N.E. at 364.
111. See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 186-87 (Me. 1989) (Wathen, J.,
dissenting).
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the public right of navigation "includes the right of mooring their vessels
thereon, and of discharging or taking in their cargoes. The owner of the
flats has no power to take away or restrict this right, while the space is
unoccupied.""' Likewise, inAndrews v. King,"' the court extended this
right to include boarding and discharging passengers for business as well
as pleasure. 114 The Law Court has also upheld the right to pass over the

flats when they are frozen. 15 These public rights appear to have been
acknowledged because they make the right of navigation complete. In
that sense they can be described as "incidental to" the right of navigation.
When an activity, however, is in no way linked with the acknowledged rights of fishing, fowling and navigation, the Law Court has
rejected arguments that public rights should be expanded. In Moore v.

Griffin,116 the Law Court held that mussel-bed manure could not be
collected from private flats. The court has prohibited the taking of
seaweed as well.117 In McFadden v. Haynes andDe Witt Ice Co., 8 the

court also concluded that ice-shavings could not be deposited on the flats
without the littoral landowner's consent. Finally, in Bell v. Town of

112.
113.
114
115.

Deering v. Proprietors of Long Wharf, 25 Me. 51, 65 (1845).
129 A. 298 (Me. 1925).
Id. at 299.
French v. Camp, 18 Me. 433 (1841); Marshall v. Walker, 45 A. 497, 498 (Me.

1900) ("Others ... may ride or skate over [the tidal flats] when covered with water-

bearing ice....").
116. 22 Me. 350, 355-56 (1843). Accord Porter v. Shehan, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 435
(1856).
117. Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83 (1861). Accord Anthony v. Gifford, 84 Mass. (2
Allen) 549 (1861) (holding that the public can collect seaweed if it is floating on the tide,
but not if it has come to rest on the sand).
There is an argument that the authors of the Colonial Ordinance, while codifying the
public rights to fishing, fowling and navigation, were aware of an approved other public
uses of the intertidal land. For example, in 1820, the Maine Legislature passed "An Act
to divide the town of Wells, and incorporate the northeasterly part thereof as a town by the
name of Kennebunk." 1820 Me. Laws 5. Section 5 of that act specifies: "That the
privileges of obtaining clams, sea-weed, and rock-weed from the beaches and flats in said
towns, which the inhabitants have been accustomed to use from time immemorial, shall
continue in common as heretofore." Id. In addition, in Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d
168 (1989) the Law Court noted that the lower court found that the "framers of the
Colonial Ordinance did not intend to curtail the public use of the intertidal zone that was
current at the time for travel and for driving and resting cattle" but also found that the
usage did not survive long enough to become a common law right. Id. at 173 n.15.
118. 29 A. 1068 (Me. 1894).
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Wells,"' the Law Court held that there is no right to use the intertidal zone
for recreational purposes such as sunbathing. 2 °
In this way, the Law Court appears to have fashioned a test based on
whether the activity is necessary for a full exercise of the acknowledged
rights. Had the Court made this test explicit, it would have a defined
means of evaluating activities conducted on tidal lands. Maine courts then
could avoid mistakes like those of the Pazolt court. In addition, an
explicit test would clarify the basis of the court's analysis and avert the
unnecessary confusion apparent in the Bell case. There, the Law Court,
in evaluating whether the public easement extends beyond the reserved
rights in the Colonial Ordinance, stated that public uses of the intertidal
zone are "only for fishing, fowling, and navigation (whether for recreation or business) and any other uses reasonably incidental or related
thereto."12 1 There should be no "reasonable" element in an analysis of
whether an activity is necessary to full exercise of a public right.
IV. CONFLICTS IN THE INTERTIDAL ZONE

Under Maine law, an applicant for a municipal lease must have the
permission of the riparian owner to engage in shellfish aquaculture on the
owner's flats. 22 The question this requirement raises is whether this
deference to the littoral property owner is consistent with the historical
development of the relative rights of the public and private owners. Given
the purpose of the Colonial Ordinance as described in the case law, the
requirement gives undue discretion to the littoral property owner.
According to every authority available, the purpose of the provision
extending riparian owners' title to the low water mark was to encourage
the construction of wharves."2 Consequently, a relevant question is

119. 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989). Bell, however, differs from the other cases cited
in this section because the Law Court evaluated a the constitutionality of a statute
purporting to grant the public general recreational use of the intertidal zone. At the same
time, the court concluded that the public had not established a right to use the intertidal
zone for general recreationa by custom.
120. Accord Butler v. Attorney General, 80 N.E. 688 (1907).
121. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d at 169.
122. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Boston Waterfront Development v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356,
360 (Mass. 1979) ("The main object of the Massachusetts Colony ordinance has always
been understood to be to induce the erection of wharves for the benefit of commerce.")
(quoting note following Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) 451, 515 (1857));
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whether the rights of the riparian owner should remain the same if the
has
implied condition of the grant is never met. At least one authority
1
concluded the rights of the riparian owner should be reassessed: 2
The State, however, grants these lands for a particular purpose;
namely, to further its commercial interests depending upon
navigation. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to say that the grant
is upon condition that the land be used for no other purposes than
those of the commerce marine. If the property is used for any
other purpose, the State should have the privilege of entering and
determining the riparian proprietor's estate. 12
Under these circumstances, it is worthwhile to consider whether a riparian
owner historically may exclude the public if the grant is not used by the
riparian owner in the prescribed manner.
In Austin v. Carter," surveyors in Charlestown removed a pier the
plaintiff had constructed on his flats. The Attorney General argued that:
[S]o also all the inhabitants of the Commonwealth, had a right to
pass and repass on the waters so long as the owner of the adjoining land leave them open and unobstructed-yet the owner of the
adjoining land may, whenever he pleases, enclose, build and
obstruct to low-water-mark, and exclude all mankind.127
The court agreed. Similarly, in Deering v. Proprietorsof Long Wharf, 8
the court stated: "So long as [the flats] remained open and free from such
erections as stop and hinder the passage of boats, &c. there is reserved for
all, the right to pass freely....

The owner of the flats has no power to

take away or restrict this right, while the space is unoccupied." 2 9 In
addition, Chief Justice Shaw, summarizing past authority on the subject

Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. (6 Tyng) 435, 438 (1810) ("For the purposes of commerce,
wharves erected below the high water mark were necessary. But the colony was not able
to build them at publick expense. To induce persons to erect them, the common law of
England was altered .... ").
124. Alfred E. McCordic & Wilson G. Crosby, The Right of Access and the Right
to Wharf Out to Navigable Water, 4 HARV. L. REV. 14 (1890).
125. Id. at 24.
126. 1 Mass. (1 Will.) 231 (1804).
127. Id. at 232.
128. 25 Me. 51 (1845).
129. Id. at 64-65.
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in Commonwealth v. Alger, 131 wrote: "That [the Colonial Ordinance]
vested the property of the flats in the owner of the upland in fee, in the
nature of a grant; but that it was to be held subject to a general right of the
public for navigation until built upon or inclosed
"3....
" Finally, in
Marshallv. Walker, 32 the Law Court stated: "[The public's] right remains
so long as [the flats] be left in a natural state, covered by the flow of the
tide and left bare by its ebb." 3 3 Taken together, the statements represent
100 years of judicial authority on the point that the riparian owner must
make use of the tidelands by building on or enclosing them in order to
exclude the public. While construction would be a severe requirement in
1995, it is appropriate to require that the riparian owner have a reasonable
purpose in excluding the public.' 34
Assuming for the purposes of argument that aquaculture leasing is
within the public right of fishing, the next question is whether requiring
an applicant to obtain the riparian owner's permission, even when that
owner has not made use of the tidelands, is consistent with the proper
exercise of the state's public trust responsibility to conserve the resource.
Arguably it is not. As even the court in Pazolt acknowledged, "[t]he
private property rights of coastal owners in the tidal area may be subordinate to the public's right if the public purposes are reasonably related to
the protection or promotion of fishing or navigation. In those circumstances, public rights may prevail .... "'"I If public rights are to prevail,
riparian owners cannot be allowed to defeat a project on a whim.'36 On
the other hand, as suggested above, riparian owners who are making some
use of the tidelands (as Glaze was by mooring his boats on the site, or as

130. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851).
131. Id.at79.
132. 45 A. 497 (Me. 1900).
133. Id.at 498.
134. Indeed, it would be hard to argue that a legislature has the authority to alter
public rights in the intertidal zone, but lacks the power to lower the burden on riparian
owners seeking a right to exclude the public.
135. Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Mass.
1994) (citing Crocker v. Champlin, 89 N.E. 129 (Mass. 1909); Home for Aged Women
v. Commonwealth, 89 NE. 124 (Mass. 1909)).
136. See Tim Eichenberg & Barbara Vestal, Improving the Legal Framework for
Marine Aquaculture: The Role of Water Quality Laws and the Public Trust Doctrine, 2
TERR. SEA J. 339, 371-72 (1992) (arguing that "unregulated power" in the hands of
riparian owners to assert their individual interests is inconsistent with the public trust
doctrine).
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Pazolt was by making the shore available to her guests) should have the
right to refuse aquaculture projects on their flats.
In Maine, as outlined above, aquaculture leasing can be conducted
only as part of a municipal shellfish conservation program. 3 7 This
provision provides the key to distinguishing aquaculture in Maine and the
factual situation in Pazolt. The requirement means that, at least theoretically, the town has developed a conservation plan involving all the town's
tidal flats. If that is the case, the town should have reviewed various uses
to which the flats have been put, including personal uses such mooring
boats, and commercial uses such as providing recreational opportunities
for motel guests, prior to designating which flats are appropriate for
shellfish aquaculture. After such a review, the towns should have the
factual bases necessary to assess and eliminate potential conflicts in the
intertidal zone. Because, however, "private rights of coastal owners in
the tidal area may be subordinate the public's right if the public purposes
are reasonably related to the protection or promotion of fishing,"1' there
should be a rebuttable presumption in favor of the public. In addition, the
burden should be on the riparian owner to demonstrate that shellfish
aquaculture would interfere substantially with the riparian owner's
reasonable expectations concerning the use of the flats.
V. CONCLUSION

This Comment has demonstrated that both legislative authority and
judicial precedent can be used to construe shellfish aquaculture as within
the public right of fishing. To strengthen that interpretation, Maine
courts, if faced with the question, should clearly delineate which test is
applicable on the given facts. Specifically, the "reasonably related" test
should be confined to an analysis of statutory provisions pertaining to
shellfish aquaculture. In contrast, the "incidental to" test should be
confined to analyses of situations in which a given activity may appertain
to the public right of fishing, but no statutory authority is available on the
point. The "natural derivative" standard should be discarded without
ceremony.
In addition, Maine policy-makers should reconsider the deference to
riparian owners currently codified in the municipal leasing statute. While

137. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
138. Pazolt v. Director of Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d at 551.
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in some instances a riparian owner may have a good argument to preclude
aquaculture on his property, which should prevail, the presumption should
be in favor of the public. A riparian owner should have the burden of
demonstrating that aquaculture would constitute a substantial interference
with the use he has made of the flats. Finally, the public trust doctrine
requires the state to manage the shellfish resource responsibly. Maine
statutory law, as it currently stands, can effectively support that effort.
Its success, however, will depend upon the willingness of coastal communities to actively conserve the resource. Shellfish aquaculture can play a
dynamic role in that process.

